NATIONAL SECURITY AND FOREIGN AFFAIRS SUBCOMMITTEE

Chairman Tierney Speaks on Afghanistan at National Press Club

Washington, D.C. – This week, the Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs Chairman John F. Tierney offered remarks on U.S. policy toward Afghanistan during a National Press Club Newsmaker event.

As Chairman of the National Security and Foreign Affairs Subcommittee for the House Oversight Committee, Tierney has embraced his role as an investigator to attack waste, fraud and abuse, and to help to secure our long-term national security. Since becoming Chairman of the Subcommittee, Congressman Tierney has held over a dozen hearings on issues facing U.S. policy in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and broader South Asia. In addition, he has traveled to the region on several occasions, including visits to Herat, Kabul and Kunar Province. In Washington, DC, Congressman Tierney frequently meets with Afghan politicians, government officials, aid workers, and professionals to get their first hand assessments of local developments.

A copy of Chairman Tierney’s speech as prepared for delivery is below:

U.S. Strategy in Afghanistan:

Changing Needs in Challenging Times

National Press Club

October 20, 2009

Remarks by Rep. John F. Tierney

Chair, Subcommittee on National Security and Foreign Affairs

Committee on Oversight and Government Reform

As Prepared for Delivery

Thank you, Peter Hickman, to you and the National Press Club for hosting this event. I welcome the opportunity to share the stage with Dr. Nadir Atash, and look forward to hearing his remarks.

The President is, and Congress will be, engaged in a serious debate concerning Afghanistan and U.S. national security in that region. Unfortunately, the country has yet to be fully engaged in this discussion, even though a decision this important needs such thorough consideration.

It is a poorly kept secret that General McChrystal has requested a significant increase in military personnel, and that he makes that request on his determination that a robust counterinsurgency approach is his preferred way forward.

Interestingly, he does so while simultaneously emphasizing a severely challenging environment in which, by his own account, the “overall situation is deteriorating.” He cites numerous challenges, including:

•Relative inadequacy of Afghan army and police forces;

• Inability of the Afghanistan national government to reach rural areas or establish a credible district or provincial presence;

•The present configuration of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) as a conventional force rather than an effective force for counterinsurgency;

•Severe illiteracy among the Afghan population;

•Rampant corruption, resulting in many Afghans perceiving the national government as being at odds with their interests; and

•Fundamentally flawed and fraudulent elections, raising serious doubts about the Afghan government’s legitimacy or trustworthiness as a partner for the international community.

It is hard to underscore the importance of the legitimacy of the Afghan government. There is no evidence that an enhanced counterinsurgency strategy, if chosen, could be effective if all else goes well. But we can be assured that counterinsurgency strategy may well fail if the Afghan government lacks legitimacy.

Moreover, General McChrystal suggests that it is imperative that we see measurable success within 1-2 years. I think that is unrealistic under classic counterinsurgency theory to expect any decisive indicators of success in such a short window, and such expectations neglect to acknowledge that most believe a counterinsurgency effort will likely take as long as 10-14 years. While some seek to pressure the White House to make a decision quickly and on this premise alone, I hope the President waits at least until we see the outcome of the November 7 Presidential run-off before he makes any final determination on the troop levels or our strategic options.

Whenever we are asked to send men and women into harm’s way, we must be certain there are achievable objectives, a clear mission, and a direct connection between the objectives, the mission, and our core national security interests. The burden of proof is on those advocating deployment, and a heavy burden it is.

Proponents of a robust counterinsurgency strategy in Afghanistan put forth two principal arguments. First, they assert that the United States needs to deny Al Qaeda a sanctuary in Afghanistan. It is important to remember that international and U.S. forces, with the help of Afghan fighters, did just that post-9/11, with air assets and a very small military footprint on the ground. Our own military estimates that there are only about 100 Al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan at this point, and those have a questionable degree of affiliation. Some say they are Tajiks and Uzbeks who like the association with the Al Qaeda brand but who have goals oriented to local Afghanistan matters.

When confronted with the absence of any robust Al Qaeda presence in Afghanistan, counterinsurgency proponents move to an assertion that a Taliban resurgence or return would lead to their invitation of Al Qaeda back to Afghanistan as sanctuary.

Yet, in the same breath, nearly everyone is talking about engaging the Taliban in seeking a political resolution because, they concede, there will be no “defeat” of all the Taliban. They are Afghans. They are not a finite number. Additionally, there have been at least some indications that even Mullah Omar’s faction may be signaling it would disassociate from Al Qaeda under certain conditions. President Karzai and his electoral opponents all indicate a strong desire to pursue reconciliation politically.

Historically, the Afghan Taliban has not had international terror capabilities or designs. In addition, it would be very difficult for Al Qaeda to operate in Afghanistan if a robust counter-terrorism operation existed that is designed to disrupt, dismantle, and destroy them. Again, please note that after 9/11, the Al Qaeda in Afghanistan and its supporters among Mullah Omar’s Taliban were routed – disrupted, dismantled, and eliminated from Afghanistan – by approximately 1,000 special operations and intelligence personnel who coordinated with like-minded local Afghan forces. Those Afghan forces, by the way, fought well at the time, long before the international community spent billions and billions of dollars on Western-style military training.

But this contention, too, does not withstand close scrutiny. First, we are all acutely aware that Al Qaeda is now believed to have its principal presence in Pakistan’s restive Western tribal regions, while also having a presence in the Maghreb, Indonesia, Yemen, Sudan, Somalia, among others. Pakistan’s militant extremists are homegrown. Unfortunately, in the past, Pakistan cultivated certain extremist groups as a means of strategic depth in the event of a conflict with India, and cultivated certain others as a means of pursuing its claims in the Kashmir region.

Now, some of those extremists have turned their venom on Pakistan, and are increasingly seen by Pakistan’s population, civilian government, and, hopefully, its military and intelligence services, as an existential threat to Pakistan itself. Recent events show evidence of commitment by Pakistan to take on these elements.

U.S. strategy where Al Qaeda is actually located stands in stark contrast to Afghanistan. In countries with a significant Al Qaeda presence, we assist host governments’ security and intelligence capabilities, and help them with other support. We condition that support upon progress on their cooperation toward core U.S. national security goals. Where advisable, we seek to strengthen democratic government with credible civilian-military lines of authority. All the while, we seek to improve defenses against terrorist acts here at home.

There are other credible options for the President to consider. That is especially true when we examine the feasibility of General McChrystal’s projections that, in 12-24 months, Afghan National Security Forces could be grown to a capable force of several hundred thousand military and between 100,000 and 200,000 police. Nothing in our experience over the last seven to eight years suggests that progress at such a rapid pace is realistic.

Similarly, counterinsurgency strategy largely relies on using rapid development projects in dangerous areas as a tactical means of winning over the local population. However, development in less secure areas has not been overwhelmingly successful and, by some accounts, may be adding fuel to corruption. Moreover, such resource allocation may be fostering resentment among communities in safer areas that feel slighted by development choices. Put simply, classic counterinsurgency doctrine risks rewarding bad behavior.

There are signs that Afghans have not been sufficiently involved in development projects so they could take advantage of capacity-building, experience and jobs emanating from foreign aid. Meanwhile, the foreign contractor community appears to be thriving.

In reality, a reading of counterinsurgency strategy indicates that, to have a reasonable chance at success, it may take hundreds of thousands more troops, contractors, and as many as 14 years of commitment.

The field general’s opinion is a key factor that must be given considerable weight and surely will be given due consideration by President Obama – on its face his plan is plausible and well thought out. Yet the President must base his decision on many factors in addition to military opinion, including strategic priorities, budgetary constraints, domestic public opinion, and the confidence of our international partners.

Counterinsurgency cost estimates over 10 years – less than the doctrinal 14 –would be $800 billion at a time when the U.S. debt is stretched and the economy is tested. The President inherited a burning house on January 20, 2009. The financial system was imploding for want of proper regulation and enforcement. We already had a huge debt from, among other things: an Iraq debacle now estimated to cost this nation over $1 trillion dollars, lost tax revenue of about $1.7 trillion due to the 2001 and 2003 lopsided tax cuts, about $1 trillion in costs because prescription drugs were added to Medicare without authorizing the Secretary to negotiate fairer pricing, and $700 billion Secretary Paulson demanded on assertions that Wall Street and the international financial system would collapse without it.

We are in the process of putting out that fire and rebuilding.

It is an awful lot to ask of the American people to invest $800 billion in a much attenuated plan with very uncertain projections, especially with no legitimate Afghanistan government partner in place.

There are other options that do not require us to abandon Afghanistan and, by many accounts, some of them stand an equal, or better, chance of attaining U.S. national security interests. One appealing option would be a more focused, and sustainable, counterterrorism effort for Afghanistan. Under such an approach, the United States and international community would have a robust, minimalist, sustainable presence in Afghanistan to keep Al Qaeda from reestablishing an operational presence there and to offer smart assistance from the international community to Afghanistan.

“Smart” assistance should:

•Set benchmarks for any emerging civil government to insure its continued legitimacy and credibility with its own people and with international community;

•Require significant, steady progress on eliminating corruption, establishing competencies, and inclusively extending the Afghan government's writ;

•Target development with civilian assistance on projects Afghans identify, work on, and see results from (e.g., energy, education, health etc.);

•Assist with law enforcement and rule of law with due attention to Afghan culture and tribal structures; and

•Continue training Afghan military and intelligence services.

A small footprint for international, NATO, and U.S. forces would:

•Protect high population areas like Kabul, Herat, Kandahar, Jalalabad, Mazar-e-Sharif, etc.; and

•Maintain aerial, special operations, and intelligence capabilities in a posture that is sustainable in the long term, while

also safer for the Afghan population and international forces.

At the same time, the United States and international community would be sending a clear message to the Taliban that:

•The Afghan people will determine their own destiny;

•The United States and international community will not abandon Afghanistan and will create a sustainable, long-term, civilian-oriented presence;

•The United States and international community have unshakable resolve to destabilize, disrupt, and destroy Al Qaeda and other like minded international terrorists in a consistent approach globally; and

How do we reconcile the following inconsistencies?

In Afghanistan, where virtually no Al Qaeda operate, we have tens of thousands of U.S. and international military troops. Yet, in Pakistan, Indonesia, Yemen, Somalia, and Sudan where we firmly believe most of Al Qaeda, including its leadership, exists, we do not have tens of thousands of troops. Instead, our strategy is to work with those local governments’ intelligence, law enforcement, and military to enable those indigenous efforts to contest Al Qaeda – or in the President’s language, to destabilize, disrupt, and destroy Al Qaeda. When necessary and appropriate, we have special operations, intelligence capacity, and/or aerial assets at the ready to engage. For example, in Pakistan there are public reports of the elimination of 12 of the top 20 members of the Al Qaeda hierarchy.

The answer to this question so far, every time I have asked it, has been a shoulder shrug accompanied by the statement, “Good question.”

Until and unless that good question can be adequately answered, I believe the President should take whatever time reasonably necessary to consider, and ultimately decide, how best to connect our national security interests with our goals and mission in the region.

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